From the outset, democracy has always been envisioned as a noble aspiration, an ideal system believed capable of guaranteeing freedom, equality, and popular participation in shaping the destiny of a nation. Yet, history has shown that democracy in its purest form has never truly existed. At best, democracy represents a constant effort to approximate an ideal rather than a state of perfection. There has always been a tension between lofty ideals and the realities of political compromise and vested interests. In this sense, crises in democracy are not anomalies but inherent to its evolution. Even in ancient Greece, democracy was approached with skepticism. Socrates likened the state to a ship that could not be entrusted to all passengers but must be steered by a captain skilled in navigating the seas. Plato went further, warning that democracy often degenerates into tyranny, as unrestrained freedom renders the people vulnerable to manipulative politicians. Aristotle sought a middle ground with the concept of polity, a blend of democracy and oligarchy that prioritized the common good.
If we shift this lens to Indonesia, these critiques resonate powerfully. The experiment with parliamentary democracy produced unstable governments, the Guided Democracy of Sukarno tilted toward authoritarianism, the Pancasila Democracy of Suharto legitimized the dominance of the New Order, and post-Reformasi procedural democracy has largely been captured by oligarchic forces and transactional politics. In short, democracy in Indonesia has never been fully realized as a system that delivers justice and prosperity for the people. As Winston Churchill famously remarked: “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried.”
Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia
The history of civil–military relations in Indonesia is deeply rooted in the struggle for independence, when the military was born out of the people’s resistance against colonial rule. From this experience grew a conviction within the armed forces that they played a decisive role in the Republic’s very existence and, therefore, were entitled to a say in its governance. This sentiment was reflected in the choice of name: Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), not “Armed Forces,” to emphasize their identity as inseparable from the people rather than an external power. This historical consciousness later crystallized in the doctrine of dwifungsi ABRI (dual function), which legitimized the military’s involvement in political, economic, and social affairs. Yet such reasoning, “from the people, for the people” has always carried the risk of eroding democracy, as governance could easily revert to the logic of command rather than the principle of deliberation and consensus.
The 1998 Reformasi sought to dismantle this dominance by abolishing dwifungsi and separating the military (TNI) from the police (Polri). The TNI was tasked solely with national defense, while the Polri assumed responsibility for law enforcement and public order. However, the reform did not eliminate frictions. Instead, new rivalries emerged, sometimes even extending into the electoral arena. The rise of political movements associated with the police, mockingly dubbed Parcok (the “brown party”) illustrated how civil–military boundaries remained contested in new forms. In recent years, signs of a return to the past have reappeared. Proposals for active officers to occupy civilian posts, the appointment of generals in bureaucratic positions, and the political rhetoric of military elites have all rekindled memories of the dwifungsi era. Whether interpreted as competition between TNI and Polri or as the military’s attempt to reclaim its political role, these developments pose a serious challenge to Indonesia’s fragile democracy.
Between Objective and Subjective Control
Samuel Huntington distinguishes between two models of civil–military relations: objective control, in which the military remains a professional body subordinate to civilian authority, and subjective control, where the armed forces serve as the political instrument of the regime in power. Indonesia has experienced both. Under the New Order, the military was firmly entrenched in the political system, exercising subjective control. After Reformasi, while its formal powers were reduced, the struggle between civilian authority and military influence persisted, underscoring the weakness of civilian supremacy. By contrast, advanced democracies demonstrate that healthy democracy requires robust civilian supremacy over the military. Indonesia’s challenge is compounded by its long history of military intervention, fragile civilian institutions, and a public often disillusioned or apathetic toward politics. Thus, civil–military relations remain a litmus test for the resilience of Indonesian democracy.
The Dilemma of Civilian Supremacy in Indonesia
One of the core principles of democracy is the supremacy of civilian authority, meaning that the military must submit to political leadership chosen by the people. In Indonesia, this principle was formally affirmed after the 1998 reforms. Yet the military’s historical self-image as the defender and savior of the Republic, makes it difficult to fully internalize subordination to civilian leaders who are often perceived as weak, corrupt, or incompetent. Reformasi, moreover, created a paradox, TNI personnel were stripped of their political rights, including the right to vote. In military logic, this has generated a psychological gap how can they be expected to obey civilian rulers whom they themselves did not help elect? Such sentiments, combined with the chronic failures of civilian elites to provide clean and effective governance, have made the temptation to return to politics ever-present. This dilemma is not unique to Indonesia. Turkey has endured multiple military interventions, Egypt remains under military dominance despite revolutionary uprisings, and Myanmar has reverted to outright junta rule. These cases illustrate the fragility of civilian supremacy in nations where the military has long been regarded as the guardian of the state. Indonesia, too, faces this delicate balance formally committed to civilian supremacy, yet substantively vulnerable to its erosion. Should the civilian elite persist in their failures, the military may once again invoke the familiar claim of acting “from the people, for the people” to justify reentering politics, thereby turning back the clock on Indonesia’s democratic journey.
References
- Aristotle. (1998). Politics (C. D. C. Reeve, Trans.). Hackett Publishing.
- Crouch, H. (2010). Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Feith, H. (2006). The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Equinox Publishing.
- Huntington, S. P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Harvard University Press.
- Lev, D. S. (2009). Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia: Selected Essays. KPG.
- Plato. (2000). The Republic (T. Griffith, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
- Stepan, A. (1988). Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton University Press.
- Sundhaussen, U. (1982). The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967. Oxford University Press.
- Varshney, A. (2000). Why democracy survives. Journal of Democracy, 9(2), 36–50.
- Zakaria, F. (2007). The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W. W. Norton & Company.
Jakarta, 14 September 2025
Chappy Hakim
